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Reply Brief of Appellant 
SCOPE OF REPLY BRIEF 
The purpose of this brief is to respond to the 
brief by the plaintiffs-respondents. The facts as set 
out by the Brief of Appellant are hereby incorporat-
ed and made a part of this brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
REPORTS FILED BY THE PARTIES TO THE AC-
CIDENT AND THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER ARE 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE UPON WHICH THE COM-
2 
MISSION MAY BASE ITS DECISION TO Sl!SPEND 
THE LICENSES OF UNINSURED MOTORISTS. 
In the hearings below, an accident report filed 
by the investigating officer was relied on by the 
Director of the Financial Responsibility Division of 
the Department of Public Safety of the State of Utah. 
The Director also relied on accident reports filed by 
the parties involved in the accident. These reports 
are present in every file. 
Both of these reports are required by Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-35 (Supp. 1969). The Utah Code aJso pro-
vides for the contents to be included in these re-
ports. One of the purposes of these reports is stated 
as follows: 
"Eve_ry such report shall also contain in-
formation sufficient to enable the department 
to determine whether the requirements for the 
deposit of security under any of the laws of 
this state are inapplicable by reason of the ex-
istence of insurance or other exceptions speci-
fied therein." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-3 7 ( c) 
(1960). 
It is clear, then, that these Section 41-6-35 reports are 
to be used by the Director in making security de-
posit determinations. 
The specific issue involved in this case deals 
with the language quoted below: 
"The commission shall determine the 
amount of security de::posit upon the basis of 
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the reports or other evidence submitted to it 
but sball not require a deposit of security for 
the benefit of any ,'>crson ivben evidence has not 
been submittd by s:tcb person or on his behalf 
as to tbe extent of l1is injuries or the damage to 
his property within fifty (50) days following the 
date of the accident .... " (Emphasis added.) 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-12-5(a) (1960). 
As has previously been pointed out, the com· 
mission has a duty to make some determinations 
on the basis of the Section 41-6-35 reports submitted 
to it. The commission cannot require a security de-
posit when neither the injured motorist nor the in-
vestigating officer submits evidence as to the extent 
of the injuries or property damage. 
In each of the cases at the bar, the injured motor-
ist had completed a report spelling out the extent of 
'nis injuries or property damc..ge. 
One should also riote that the statutory lan-
guage in Section 41-12-S(a) allows for submission of 
reports "on his {secured party's) behalf." This would 
include the officer's reports and estimates made by 
body shops and personal injury reports fille:-d in by 
physicians, which re:oorts are never sought directly 
by the department, but only solicited by the parties 
to the accident desiring accurate reports to be be-
fore the commission. 
Since this report c.=in be made "on his behalf," 
there need not be an additional "affirmative act ... 
made by an injured oarty to show that he desires 
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to invoke the benefits of the act." Brief of Respon-
dents at 9. 
The Brief of Respondent interprets the trial 
co'Jrt to hold that if one is injured by an uninsured 
motorist and the injured person files the required 
41-6-35 reports, he would also have to file additional 
reports, even though the original 41-6-35 reports cov-
erc::d the full extent of the injuries. It would be more 
logical to allow the reports to serve dual functions. 
If further injuries such as medical costs or more ac-
curate property damages through estimates are un-
avJ.ilable within the five days required for report-
ing, but are subsequently received, they could be 
filed as supplementary evidence of damages with-
in the fifty day period required in Section 41-12-5(a), 
as amended in 1960. 
The only mandate of the statute is the filing of 
the Section 41-6-35 reports. If one fails to file these 
reports, then he is subject to the following statute: 
". . . Any person convicted of failing to 
make a report as required herein shall be pun-
ished as provided in Section 41-6-164 (mis-
demeanor)." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-37(d) 
(Supp. 1969). 
Not only can he be punished for a misdemeanor, 
but he loses his rights (after 50 days) of obtaining a 
supplemented security deposit from an uninsured 
motorist through Utah Code Ann. § 41-12-5(a) (1960). 
This is the logical way of reading the clause: 
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". . . but it shall not require a deposit of 
security for the benefit of any person when evi-
dence has not been submitted by such person 
or on his behalf as to the extent of his injuries 
or the damage to his property within fifty (50) 
days following the date of the accident." Utah 
Code Ann.§ 41-12-5(a) (1960). 
It should also be kept in mind that the Safety 
Responsibility Act is for the public protection, not 
just the protection of the injured motorist. This may 
be one reason why the statute allows one (such as 
the investigating officer) to file reports "on his be--
half." 
In a recent (and as yet unreported) Utah Su-
preme Court case, the Court dealt with the same lan-
guage that is involved in this case. That case dealt 
with the problem which bothered Judge Croft and 
the respondents--the injustice when there is clear 
liability on the part of the injured motorist. The 
Court stated: 
"We believe the department should con-
sider all of the facts presented to it by way of 
accident reports, the reportS of investigating 
officers and other evidence submitted to it and 
where the evidence would indicate that there is 
a lack of culpability on the part of the driver 
or drivers, the department should not under 
those conditions suspend the operator's license 
or the automobile registrations of the person or 
persons involved." Hague v. State of Utah, No. 
11494, Filed December 5, 1969, at page 2. 
%e Hague case requires the commission to use 
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a standard, and the standard as suggested in Hague 
must be available through the reports before it. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requires that for the 
reasons above stated, the lower court's decision 
should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
LAURENN.BEASLEY 
Chief Assistant Attorney 
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Assistant Attorney General 
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